Analysis and Recommended Settings of the Security ...

Frank_Buchholz · ‎12-11-2014

This document was generated from the following discussion: Recommended Settings for the Security Audit Log (SM19 / SM20)

This blog had started to give recommendations about settings for the Security Audit Log, but in the meantime it had evolved to show tips & tricks in general.

Another sound source for information are the FAQ notes 539404 "FAQ: Answers to questions about the Security Audit Log" and 2191612 "FAQ | Use of Security Audit Log as of NetWeaver 7.50".

Contents

Recommended Settings for the Security Audit Log (SM19 / RSAU_CONFIG, SM20 / RSAU_READ_LOG)

See note 2676384

Profile Parameters / Kernel Parameters

As of release SAP_BASIS 7.40 you can use the so-called "Kernel Parameters" instead of the listed Profile Parameters. You find them on a new tab in transaction SM19 respective transaction RSAU_CONFIG. See chapter Preparing the Security Audit Log in the Online Documentation. You can set them dynamically and once set they overwrite the values of the profile parameters. Take care to inspect these Kernel Parameters after an upgrade to SAP_BASIS 7.40 or higher.

Old profile parameters:

rsau/enable = 1

rsau/selection_slots = 10 (or higher if available)

rsau/user_selection = 1

rsau/integrity = 1

DIR_AUDIT and FN_AUDIT define the path and the file name pattern for the log files. These are the only profile parameters which are in use if you have switched to the "Kernel Parameters".

Filter settings in SM19 / RSAU_CONFIG

Depending on the release you can set 10, 15 (as of SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP 😎 or 90 (as of SAP_BASIS 7.50 SP 2) filters. See FAQ Note 539404 item [4].

1. Filter: Activate everything which is critical for all users '*' in all clients '*'.

You may deactivate the messages of class “User master record change (32)” because you get change documents for users in transaction SUIM anyway.

Consider to add messages AUO, AUZ, BU5, BU6, BU7, BU9, BUA, BUB BUC, BUH, AUP, AUQ

If you maintain logical file names using transaction FILE (see note 1497003) than add messages CUQ, CUR, CUS, CUT, DU5

If you maintain an Access Control List for RFC callback (see note 2128095) than add messages DUI, DUJ, DUK

2. Filter: Activate everything for special user SAP* in all clients '*'

You cannot use a filter 'SAP*' because this would include the virtual user SAPSYS because of profile parameter rsau/user_selection = 1. This virtual user SAPSYS performs many house-keeping activities triggered by the system itself. You do not want to log these events.

However, you can use the special filter value 'SAP#*' instead.

You can use this special filter value 'SAP#*' in transaction SM20, report RSAU_SELECT_EVENTS respective transaction/report RSAU_READ_LOG as well to show log entries in for user SAP* only.

If you can defines positive and negative filters for user groups (see note 2285879) then you can create filters for user groups like SUPER instead. This has the additional advantage that the built-in user SAPSYS does not produce any logs.

3+4. Filter: Activate everything for other support and emergency users, e.g. 'SAPSUPPORT*' (SAP Support users) respective 'FF*' (FireFighter) in all clients '*'.

If you can defines filters for user groups then you can create filters for corresponding user groups instead.

5. Filter: Activate all events for the dialog activities 'logon' and 'transaction' for user 'DDIC' in all clients '*'. This user should not be used in dialog mode. It's only required for specific activities while applying support packages or while importing transports (however in this case you can use another background user as well).

6. Filter: Activate everything for client '066'. This client is not used anymore and can be deleted (see https://blogs.sap.com/2013/06/06/how-to-remove-unused-clients-including-client-001-and-066/ ).

7. Filter: Activate RFC events (AUL, AUK, AU6, AU5) for a short time for selected users to identity RFC connection problems easily (see https://blogs.sap.com/2010/12/05/how-to-get-rfc-call-traces-to-build-authorizations-for-srfc-for-fre... ).

8. and following Filter: free for other project specific purpose

Hints:

The client field accepts either single values like 000 or a * to catch all clients.

The user field accepts pattern characters as well (see note 574914😞

* any sequence of characters (only the first * within the filter string is interpreted as a pattern character)

+ one character

# disable following pattern character

The user group field accepts exacts values only.

Using the print function (command PRINT) in transaction SM19 or using report RSAU_INFO_SYAG you can show an overview about the current settings.

List of events

If you miss some of the events described in this document then search for notes of application component BC-SEC-SAL.

Using note 1970644 you can get report RSAU_INFO_SYAG which shows all events of the Security Audit Log including a summarized status about the activation of the events. The detail view allows you to create an HTML-based event definition print list including the full documentation.

Within transaction SM19 you can use the system function =PRINT (respective the printer icon in the top icon row) to document the definition of static profiles as well as the current definition of the dynamic configuration. This list shows the details about all filter slots.

Events ordered by selected topics and security optimization projects:

Topic Keyword	Description and references	Message
BACK	RFC callback (note 2128095) Project: "Secure RFC Callback"	DUI DUJ DUK
CCM_TOOLSET_STARTER		BUX
CDS views		EUV
CHANGABILITY	System settings and client settings about changability (note 2299636)	EU1 EU2
CUSTOM	Custom specific events using function module RSAU_WRITE_CUSTOMER_EVTS (note 1941526)	DUX DUY DUZ
DEBUG	Debugging (change mode)	BUZ, CUK, CUL, CU_M, CUN, CUO, CUP, CUY (BUY is obsolete)
EHS-SADM	(note 1792047)	DUA DUB DUC DUD DUE DUF DUG
ETD	ETD Housekeeping see notes 2850969, 3313550 and 3265014	FUG FUH FUI
FILE	Directory Traversal (note 1497003) Project: "Secure File access"	CUQ CUR CUS CUT DU5 EU4
OAUTH	OAuth 2.0	(AU2) BUV BUW DUH
PAYLOAD		CUU CUX
RAL	Read Access Logging (note 1902280)	BU0 CU0
RBAM	Role Based Access Management in SAP Business ByDesign system (note 948275)	BUI BUJ
REPORT	Report start Project: "Avoid SA38 by using custom report transactions"	AUW AUX
RFC-TABLE	Generic table access via RFC using functions like RFC_READ_TABLE (note 1539105) Project: "Secure standard table access (authorization object S_TABU_RFC)"	CUZ DU9
SAL	SAL Housekeeping	... EU6
S4_CLOUD	S/4 Cloud SDK (note 2478128), obsolete (2023-09)	EUA EUB EUC EUD EUH
SACF	Switchable authorization scenarios, transaction SACF (note 2078596) Project: "Secure RFC functions"	DUO DUP DUQ DUU DUV
SAML	SAML Authentication, transaction SRTUTIL (note 1570266) You get long messages for events CUB and CUC instead of splitted messages as of note 2939942.	(AU2) BUK BUL BUM BUN BUO BUP CUA CUB CUC CUD CUE CUF CUG CUH
SAP_FTP	FTP server whitelist using table SAPFTP_SERVERS (note 1605054) See note 2312710 for more information about these messages. You can duplicate the messages related to FTP into the Syslog by using report RSAU_SET_DOUBLE_MODE (see note 1686247). Project: "Secure SAP FTP"	DU1 DU2 DU3 DU4 DU5 DU6 DU7 DU8
SE16	Generic table access using transactions like SE16, SE16N, S416N, S416H, etc. SE16N_EMERGENCY, SM30, SM31, SM34, or SQV (notes 2041892, 3140539) Project: "Secure standard table access (authorization object S_TABU_DIS, S_TABU_NAM)"	DU9 FUF
SLDW	Generic whitelists	DUL DUM DUN
SNC	SNC Client Encryption (note 2104732) Project: "Encrypt SAPGUI comminication"	BUJ
TCODE	Transactions	AU3 AU4 AUP AUQ
TEST	Secure the test envorinment in transaction SE37 for functions and SE24 for methods. Notes 3292306 and 3274589 Project: "Secure ABAP test environment"	FUJ FUK
UCON_HTTP	UCON for http (notes 2522156 and 3298279) Project: "Protect webservices using UCON"	EUI EUJ EUK EUL EUM EUN EUO FUL
USER	Change user master data (not required as you get change documents anyway)	AU8 AU7 AU9 AUA AUB AUD AUR AUS AUT AUU BU2 FU8
VSI	Virus Scan Interface	BU8 BU9 FU9
WEB-SERVICE	Web service calls (note 1620477)	CUV CUW
XSRF	XSRF attacks (note 1619912) This event is triggered if subsequent request calls do not contain the user session token 'sap-wd-secure-id' which was send by the server in the first response.	BUS

Note 2073809 shows special documentation/changes about the messages

BUY (which is replaced by message CUL),

CUY (which is related to debugger messages BUZ, CUL, CU_M, CUN, CUO, CUP), and

CUZ (which is related to message DU9).

List of events from table TSL1D respective report RSAU_INFO_SYAG.

This list is a snapshot - check it in your system - with a comparison between release 702, 740 and 750. Some of the new messages may be added with 731 or with downports already. See following notes which are described in report RSAU_SYNC_EVENTS (start this report in the development system to bring the event definitions up to date):

Note 1411741 BUY CUK
Note 1639726 CUQ CUR CUS CUT
Note 1666804 BUX
Note 1686247 DU1 DU2 DU3 DU4 DU5 DU6 DU7 DU8
Note 1707878 CUU CUX
Note 1789518 AU1 AU2 AU5 AU6
Note 1792047 DUA DUB DUC DUD DUF DUG
Note 1802077 BUV BUW DUH
Note 1880984 DUL DUM DUN DUO BU0 CU0 DUP DUQ
Note 1938382 DUR DUS DUT
Note 1941526 DUX DUY DUZ
Note 1941568 DUX DUY DUZ
Note 1968729 DUI DUJ DUK
Note 2073809 CUY BUY CUZ
Note 2128095 DUI DUJ DUK
Note 2161582 FU1 FU2
Note 2176138 AU1 AU2 AU6 BUA BUB BUC BUD BUE BUI CU0 DUI DUJ DUK DUQ DUU DUV
Note 2234569 AUY
Note 2252312 DUJ DUK
Note 2299636 EU1 EU2 EUQ EUR
Note 2312710 DU1 DU2 DU3 DU4 DU5 DU6 DU7 DU8
Note 2446979 EU3 EU4 EU5
Note 2478128 EUA EUB EUC EUD EUE EUF EUG EUH EUV
Note 2578343 EUV
Note 2522156 EUI EUJ EUK EUL EUM EUN EUO EUL EUM EUN
Note 2578918 DUW
Note 2785904 FU3 FU4 FU8 FUA FUB FUC FUD FUE
sync 04/2020: FU0 EUP EUY EUZ BUX

The column "Cloud relevant" shows which events are visible in the App Display Static System Audit on private cloud systems as defined in static profile !DISPLAY (see note 2903873).

Audit Class	Message ID	Event class	New in release	Cloud relevant	Message
Dialog Logon	AU1	Severe		X	Logon successful (type=&A, method=&C)
Dialog Logon	AU2	Critical		X	Logon failed (reason=&B, type=&A, method=&C)
Dialog Logon	AUC	Non-Critical			User Logoff
Dialog Logon	AUM	Critical with Monitor Alert			User &B Locked in Client &A After Erroneous Password Checks
Dialog Logon	AUN	Critical			User &B in Client &A Unlocked After Being Locked Due to Inval.Password Entered
Dialog Logon	AUO	Severe		X	Logon Failed (Reason = &B, Type = &A)
Dialog Logon	BUD	Critical		X	WS: Delayed logon failed (type &B, WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Dialog Logon	BUE	Non-Critical		X	WS: Delayed logon successful (type &B, WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Dialog Logon	BUI	Critical			SPNego replay attack detected (UPN=&A)
Dialog Logon	BUK	Non-Critical			&A assertion used
Dialog Logon	BUL	Non-Critical			&A: &B
Dialog Logon	BUM	Non-Critical			Name ID of a subject
Dialog Logon	BUN	Non-Critical			Attribute
Dialog Logon	BUO	Non-Critical			Authentication assertion
Dialog Logon	BUP	Non-Critical			&A
Dialog Logon	BUQ	Non-Critical			Signed LogoutRequest accepted
Dialog Logon	BUR	Non-Critical			Unsigned LogoutRequest accepted
Dialog Logon	CU2	Severe	740		OAuth 2.0: Invalid access token received (reason=&A)
Dialog Logon	CU3	Severe	740		OAuth 2.0: Insufficient OAuth 2.0 scope for requested resource (user=&A)
Dialog Logon	CU4	Critical	740		OAuth 2.0: Logged-on client user &A not same as parameter client ID &B
Dialog Logon	CU5	Severe	740		OAuth 2.0: Client &A requested invalid access grant type &B
Dialog Logon	CU6	Critical	740		OAuth 2.0: Client ID &A in SAML assertion not same as client ID &B in request
Dialog Logon	CU7	Severe	740		OAuth 2.0: Scope &B not permitted for client &C, user &D (cause=&A)
Dialog Logon	CU8	Non-Critical	740		OAuth 2.0: Access token issued (client=&A, user=&B, grant type=&C)
Dialog Logon	CU9	Non-Critical	740		OAuth 2.0: Valid access token received for user &A
Dialog Logon	CUA	Severe			Rejected Assertion
Dialog Logon	CUB	Severe			&A: &B
Dialog Logon	CUC	Severe			&A
Dialog Logon	CUD	Severe			Name ID of a subject
Dialog Logon	CUE	Severe			Attribute
Dialog Logon	CUF	Severe			Authentication Assertion
Dialog Logon	CUG	Severe			Signed LogoutRequest rejected
Dialog Logon	CUH	Severe			Unsigned LogoutRequest rejected
Dialog Logon	DU0	Critical with Monitor Alert			Invalid SAP GUI data
Dialog Logon	EUC	Critical	new		OAuth scope &A not assigned to the user
Dialog Logon	EUC	Critical	new		HTTP request not received from trustworthy cloud connector (reason &A)
Dialog Logon	EUD	Critical	new Note 2478128SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP 18, 7.50 SP 9, 7.51 SP 4Obsolete since September 2023 (?) (added 2023-11)		HTTP request not received from trustworthy cloud connector (reason &A)
Dialog Logon	EUP	Critical	new as of Kernel 790 Note 3303172 (added 2023-11)		Virtual user client=&A type=&B action=&C &D
RFC Logon	AU5	Non-Critical			RFC/CPIC logon successful (type=&A, method=&C)
RFC Logon	AU6	Critical		X	RFC/CPIC logon failed, reason=&B, type=&A, method=&C
RFC Function Call	AUK	Non-Critical			Successful RFC Call &C (Function Group = &A)
RFC Function Call	AUL	Critical			Failed RFC Call &C (Function Group = &A)
RFC Function Call	CUV	Non-Critical			Successful WS Call (service = &A, operation &B)
RFC Function Call	CUW	Critical			Failed Web service call (service = &A, operation = &B, reason = &C)
RFC Function Call	CUZ	Critical			Generic table access by RFC to &A with activity &B
RFC Function Call	DU1	Severe			FTP server whitelist is empty
RFC Function Call	DU2	Severe			FTP server whitelist is non-secure due to use of placeholders
RFC Function Call	DU3	Critical			Server &A is not contained in the whitelist
RFC Function Call	DU4	Critical			Connection to server &A failed
RFC Function Call	DU5	Critical			There is no logical file name for path &A
RFC Function Call	DU6	Non-Critical			Validation for &A successful
RFC Function Call	DU7	Critical with Monitor Alert			Validation for &A failed
RFC Function Call	DU8	Non-Critical			FTP connection request for server &A successful
RFC Function Call	DUI	Non-Critical	Note 2128095		RFC callback performed (destination &A, called &B, callback &C)
RFC Function Call	DUJ	Critical	Note 2128095		RFC callback rejected (destination &A, called &B, callback &C)
RFC Function Call	DUK	Critical	Note 2128095		RFC callback in simulation mode (destination &A, called &B, callback &C)
RFC Function Call	DUR	Non-Critical			JSON RPC call of function module &A succeeded
RFC Function Call	DUS	Non-Critical			JSON RPC call of function module &A failed
RFC Function Call	DUT	Critical			Critical JSON RPC call of function module &A (S_RFC * authorization)
RFC Function Call	EUE	Non-Critical	new		RFC function module &A called successfully
RFC Function Call	EUF	Non-Critical	new		Could not call RFC function module &A
RFC Function Call	EUG	Non-Critical	new		User does not have authorization to run RFC function module &A
RFC Function Call	EUI	Severe	740 Note 2522156		Setup of UCON HTTP whitelist changed
RFC Function Call	EUJ	Severe	740 Note 2522156		Phase of UCON HTTP whitelist of context type &A changed
RFC Function Call	EUK	Critical	740 Note 2522156		Access to UCON HTTP whitelist of context type &A was refused
RFC Function Call	EUL	Severe	740 Note 2522156		Setting of content security policy whitelist for type &A changed
RFC Function Call	EUM	Severe	740 Note 2522156		Content security policy whitelist of context type &A changed
RFC Function Call	EUN	Critical	740 Note 2522156		Content security policy of CSP type &A violated
RFC Function Call	EUO	Severe	740 Note 2522156		UCON HTTP whitelist of context type &A was changed
RFC Function Call	FU1	Non-Critical	740		RFC function &B with dynamic destination &C was called in program &A
Transaction Start	AU3	Non-Critical		X	Transaction &A Started
Transaction Start	AU4	Critical		X	Start of transaction &A failed (Reason=&B)
Transaction Start	AUP	Severe			Transaction &A Locked
Transaction Start	AUQ	Severe			Transaction &A Unlocked
Transaction Start	BUX	Severe	740		Test message
Transaction Start	CUI	Non-Critical	740		Application &A started
Transaction Start	CUJ	Critical	740		Failed to start application &A (reason =&B)
Transaction Start	DU9	Non-Critical			Generic table access call to &A with activity &B (auth. check: &C )
Transaction Start	EUA	Non-Critical	new		S/2 Cloud SDK ABAP component called
Transaction Start	FUF	Critical	new 740 Note 3140539 (added 2023-11)		Generic modifying data access on &A started using &B
Transaction Start	GU1	Non-Critical	new Statistic events computed by standard job RSAU_MAINT_LOG from CUI/CUJ events.There are no generic follow up activities needed.(added 2023-11)	X	Start authority check for &A ( &B ) successful
Report Start	AUW	Non-Critical			Report &A Started
Report Start	AUX	Severe			Start Report &A Failed (Reason = &B)
Report Start	EUQ	Severe	740 Notes 3022618 and 3021889	X	Analysis program &A &B was started in simulation mode
Report Start	EUR	Critical		X	Analysis program &A &B was started in production mode
User Master Record Change	AU7	Critical			User &A Created
User Master Record Change	AU8	Severe			User &A Deleted
User Master Record Change	AU9	Severe			User &A Locked
User Master Record Change	AUA	Severe			User &A Unlocked
User Master Record Change	AUB	Severe			Authorizations for User &A Changed
User Master Record Change	AUD	Severe			User Master Record &A Changed
User Master Record Change	AUR	Severe			&A &B Created
User Master Record Change	AUS	Severe			&A &B Deleted
User Master Record Change	AUT	Severe			&A &B Changed
User Master Record Change	AUU	Critical			&A &B Activated
User Master Record Change	BU2	Non-Critical	Note 3075661		Password changed for user &B in client &A
User Master Record Change	BUV	Critical	740		Invalid hash value &A. The context contains &B.
User Master Record Change	BUW	Critical	740		A refresh token issued to client &A was used by client &B.
User Master Record Change	DUH	Severe with Monitor Alert	740		OAuth 2.0: Token declared invalid (OAuth client=&A, user=&B, token type=&C)
User Master Record Change	EUH	Non-Critical	new		Authorizations of user &A for authorization object &B detected
User Master Record Change	FU8	Severe			Lock entry deleted for user &A
Other events	AU0	Non-Critical			Audit - Test. Text: &A
Other events	AUV	Critical			Digital Signature Error (Reason = &A, ID = &B)
Other events	AUY	Severe	731	X	Download &A Bytes to File &C
Other events	AUZ	Severe			Digital Signature (Reason = &A, ID = &B)
Other events	BU0	Critical with Monitor Alert			RAL configuration access: Action: &A, type: &B, name &C
Other events	BU1	Critical with Monitor Alert		X	Password check failed for user &B in client &A
Other events	BU3	Critical with Monitor Alert			Security check changed in export: Old value &A, new value &B
Other events	BU4	Non-Critical			Dynamic ABAP code: Event &A, event type &B, check total &C
Other events	BU5	Severe			ICF recorder entry executed for user &A (activity &B)
Other events	BU6	Severe			ICF recorder entry executed by user &A (&B, &C) (activity &D).
Other events	BU7	Severe			Administration setting was changed for ICF Recorder (Activity: &A)
Other events	BU8	Critical			Virus Scan Interface: Virus "&C" found by profile &A (step &B)
Other events	BU9	Severe			Virus Scan Interface: Error "&C" occurred in profile &A (step &B)
Other events	BUA	Severe			WS: Signature check error (reason &B, WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Other events	BUB	Severe			WS: Signature insufficient (WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Other events	BUC	Severe			WS: Time stamp is invalid. Refer to Web service log &A.
Other events	BUF	Non-Critical			HTTP Security Session Management was activated for client &A.
Other events	BUG	Critical with Monitor Alert			HTTP Security Session Management was deactivated for client &A.
Other events	BUH	Severe with Monitor Alert			HTTP Security Session of user &A (client &B) was hard exited
Other events	BUJ	Severe	Note 2104732		Non-encrypted &A communication (&B)
Other events	BUS	Critical			&A: Request without sufficient security characteristic of address &B.
Other events	BUT	Severe	740		CRL download failed with error code &A
Other events	BUU	Critical	740		Certificate check for subject "&A" with profile &B failed (status &C)
Other events	BUY	Critical			Field contents changed: &5&9&9&9&9&9
Other events	BUZ	Very Critical		X	[The contents of the specified field were changed in the ABAP Debugger] > in program &A, line &B, event &C
Other events	CU0	Critical			RAL Log Access: Action: &A
Other events	CU1	Severe			CU Test Message
Other events	CUK	Critical		X	C debugging activated
Other events	CUL	Very Critical		X	Field content changed: &A
Other events	CU_M	Very Critical		X	Jump to ABAP Debugger: &A
Other events	CUN	Very Critical		X	A manually caught process was stopped from within the Debugger (&A)
Other events	CUO	Very Critical		X	Explicit database commit or rollback from debugger &A
Other events	CUP	Very Critical		X	Non-exclusive debugging session started
Other events	CUQ	Severe			Logical file name &A not configured. Physical file name &B not checked.
Other events	CUR	Severe			Physical file name &B does not fulfill requirements from logical file name &A
Other events	CUS	Severe			Logical file name &B is not a valid alias for logical file name &A
Other events	CUT	Severe			Validation for logical file name &A is not active
Other events	CUU	Non-Critical	Note 1707878		Payload of PI/WS message &A was read \| &B
Other events	CUX	Non-Critical	Note 1707878		Payload of postprocessing request &A read
Other events	CUY	Non-Critical			> &A
Other events	DUA	Severe	731		EHS-SADM: Service &A created on host &B
Other events	DUB	Severe	731		EHS-SADM: Service &A started on host &B
Other events	DUC	Severe	731		EHS-SADM: Service &A ended on host &B
Other events	DUD	Severe	731		EHS-SADM: Service &A deleted on host &B
Other events	DUE	Non-Critical	731		EHS-SADM: Configuration of service &A changed on host &B
Other events	DUF	Non-Critical	731		EHS-SADM: File &A transferred from host &B
Other events	DUG	Non-Critical	731		EHS-SADM: File &A transferred to host &B
Other events	DUL	Non-Critical			Check for &A in whitelist &B was successful
Other events	DUM	Severe with Monitor Alert			Check for &A in whitelist &B failed
Other events	DUN	Critical with Monitor Alert			Active whitelist &A changed ( &B )
Other events	DUO	Non-Critical			Authorization check for object &A in scenario &B successful
Other events	DUP	Non-Critical			Authorization check for object &A in scenario &B failed
Other events	DUQ	Critical with Monitor Alert			Active scenario &A for switchable authorization checks changed - &B
Other events	DUU	Non-Critical			Authorization check for user &C on object &A in scenario &B successful
Other events	DUV	Non-Critical			Authorization check for user &C on object &A in scenario &B failed
Other events	DUW	Non-Critical	740 Note 2578918		Data target accessed in BW &A
Other events	DUX	Non-Critical	740		TEMP: Customer-specific event DUX &A &B &C &D
Other events	DUY	Non-Critical	740		TEMP: Customer-specific event DUY &A &B &C &D
Other events	DUZ	Non-Critical	740		TEMP: Customer-specific event DUZ &A &B &C &D
Other events	EU0	Non-Critical			Test Message for Class EU
Other events	EU3	Critical	750		&A change documents deleted without archiving (&B)
Other events	EU4	Non-Critical	new		Validation successful for logical file name &A (physical: &B)
Other events	EUB	Critical	new		Could not verify the digital signature: &A
Other events	EUS	Severe		X	Read access to DCT change log (&A)
Other events	EUT	Severe		X	DCT change log (&A) was reorganized
Other events	EUU	Critical	Note 3050692		Suspect WHERE-Clause during generic table access to table &A (Clause &B)
Other events	EUV	Non-Critical	740		CDS view &A (field &B) was published
Other events	EUW	Non-Critical	740		Blocklist is activated (connection/table/field: &A &B &C)
Other events	EUX	Non-Critical	740		Blocklist is deactivated (connection/table/field: &A &B &C)
Other events	EUY	Non-Critical	740		Data blocking activated for &A
Other events	EUZ	Non-Critical	740		Data blocking deactivated for &A
Other events	FU2	Severe	740		Parsing of an XML data stream canceled for security reasons (reason = &A)
Other events	FU3	Non-Critical		X	Template &A (&B) loaded
Other events	FU4	Severe		X	Could not upload enhancement template &A
Other events	FU5	Severe	new for application "Customer Data Browser" Note 3319853 SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP 30, 7.50 SP 28, 7.51 SP 17, 7.52 SP 13, 7.53 SP 11, 7.54 SP 9, 7.55 SP 7, 7.56 SP 5, 7.57 SP 3, 7.57 SP 1 Public Cloud: Online Help BTP ABAP or S/4HANA Cloud Note 2903873 (added 2023-11)	X	Access to object &A (&B), &C entries contain &D, authorization check &E
Other events	FU9	Severe	new as of 750 Notes 3165706 and 3165707 (added 2023-11)		Virus scan profile &A not active. Scan was not executed.
Other events	FUA	Critical			Audit alert: &A \| &B &C &D
Other events	FUC	Non-Critical			Attempted read on output document &A for object &B ( &C )
Other events	FUD	Non-Critical		X	Successful read on output document &A for object &B ( &C )
Other events	FUE	Critical		X	Failed read on output document &A for object &B ( &C )
Other events	FUG	Severe	new as of 740 Notes 3313550 and 3265014(added 2023-11)		ETD configuration access (action: &A, name: &B, type: &C, status: &D)
Other events	FUH	Critical	new as of 740 Notes 3313550 and 3265014(added 2023-11)		ETD configuration status changed (status new: &A, name: &B, type: &C)
Other events	FUI	Non-Critical	new as of 740 Notes 3313550 and 3265014 (added 2023-11)		ETD trace was downloaded
Other events	FUJ	Critical	new as of 740 Notes 3292306 and 3274589 (added 2023-11)		Function module &A was started in the test environment (destination &B)
Other events	FUK	Critical	new as of 740 Notes 3292306 and 3274589 (added 2023-11)		Method &B of the class &A was started in the test environment
Other events	FUL	Non-Critical	new as of 740 Note 3298279 (added 2023-11)		Area constructor started for &A
Other events	FUM	Severe	new as of 740 Note 3319853 (added 2023-11)		SQL statement &B sent to system &A (&C)
Other events	FUN	Non-Critical	new as of 740 Note 3319853 (added 2023-11)		Result for event FUM for &A (&B) - SQL code &C - &D
Other events	FUO	Non-Critical	new as of 740 Note 3319853 (added 2023-11)		Error code for FUM for &A (&B) - SQL code &C - &D
Other events	FUP	Critical	new as of 740 Note 3319853 (added 2023-11)		Error code for FUM for &A (&B) - SQL code &C - &D
Other events	FUQ	Non-Critical	new as of 740 Note 3319853 (added 2023-11)		CI/CD Landscape portal call (action &A \| entity &B \| commit ID &C \| info &D )
Other events	FUR	Severe	new as of 750 Note 3386875 (added 2023-11)		File share client for user &A in privileged mode of class &B
Other events	GU2	Non-Critical	new Statistic events computed by standard job RSAU_MAINT_LOG from CUI/CUJ events.There are no generic follow up activities needed.(added 2023-11)		Statistic data for log data enrichment collected till &A ( &B entries )
System / housekeeping	AUE	Very Critical			Audit Configuration Changed
System / housekeeping	AUF	Very Critical			Audit: Slot &A: Class &B, Severity &C, User &D, Client &E, &F
System / housekeeping	AUG	Very Critical			Application Server Started
System / housekeeping	AUH	Very Critical			Application Server Stopped
System / housekeeping	AUI	Very Critical			Audit: Slot &A Inactive
System / housekeeping	AUJ	Very Critical with Monitor Alert			Audit: Active Status Set to &1
System / housekeeping	EU1	Very Critical	731 Note 2299636	X	System changeability changed (&A to &B)
System / housekeeping	EU2	Very Critical	731 Note 2299636	X	Client setting for &A changed (&B)
System / housekeeping	EU5	Non-Critical	new		Audit log data of &A was deleted (&B data records)
System / housekeeping	EU6	Non-Critical			SAL log file &A passed to table &B (records: &C/reason: &D)
System / housekeeping	EU7	Critical	new (added 2023-11)		I/O error on audit file &A
System / housekeeping	FU0	Very Critical	750		Exclusive security audit log medium changed (new status &1)
System / housekeeping	FUB	Critical			TEMP: Customer-specific event FUB &A &B &C &D

File format

Warning: The file format is defined SAP internally - it's not an official definition which can be used freely. Use the information with care as storage and format can change with newer releases.

As of release 7.50 you can choose if log events are stored in the files as described in this section or in the database table RSAU_BUF_DATA or at both locations (see note 2191612).

Use report RSAU_SELECT_EVENTS to analyze the file format.

The audit files have a structured but variable record layout in unicode text format.

The administrative information is fixed, however, there exist 2 record formats depending on the existence of the additional field SLGLTRM2.

The data part, field SLGDATA, containing 64 characters has a variable sub-structure containing several parameter values. Often these values are separated by '&' matching to the message variables &A, &B, etc. of the message definition. If you don't find an '&' than you will have fixed length parameter values matching to the message variables &n (n is a number describing the count of characters) within the message definition.

Relevant DDIC structures:

RSLGENTR SysLog entry

RSAUENTR2 Security Audit Log Entry Version 2 with Long Terminal Names

Example of an entry in a .aud file:

2AU520130409010803000505200009D9a234ba.pDOKUSTAR SAPMSSY1 0201R&0 h020co.pt.com

This leads to the following file format:

Field	Sub-field	Length	Description
SLGTYPE			SysLog: LIKE structure RSLGETYP
	SLGFTYP	1	Entry type: "q" = version 1 without field SLGLTRM2, "2" = version 2 including field SLGLTRM2
	AREA	2	Message area
	SUBID	1	Message name
SLGDATTIM			Time stamp (CHAR 16)
	DATE	8	Date in format YYYYMMDD
	TIME	6	Time in format hhmmss
	DUMMY	2	not used
SLGPROC			SysLog: LIKE RSLGPID structure
	UNIXPID	5	Process ID
	TASKTNO	5	Task
	SLGTTYP	2	Process type (short form)
SLGLTRM		8	Terminal name (truncated)
SLGUSER		12	User name
SLGTC		20	Transaction
SLGREPNA		40	Program
SLGMAND		3	Client
SLGMODE		1	External mode of an SAP dialog
SLGDATA		64	Variable message data
SLGLTRM2		20	Terminal name (continued), only available if SLGFTYP=2

You see,

the format of the variable message data

the message class (logon, transaction start, report start, RFC logon, user master record change, RFC start, miscellaneous, and system)

the severity (critical, important, non-critical)

and the monitoring alert settings (with, without)

are not visible within the file, but only in the message definition in table TSL1D (the key fields are AREA and SUBID).

Terminal ID versus IP Address

The Security Audit Log normally logs the terminal id if it's available; otherwise the IP address is logged. You can set the (undocumented) profile parameter rsau/ip_only to the value 1 to log the IP address instead (if available). See note 1497445 for details.

Use the following options to get the terminal id and the IP address of active users:

Transaction SM04 shows the IP address of the GUI client as well if you change the layout. (Limited to currently active users.)

Table USR41 containing the last logon date shows both terminal id and the IP address in field TERMINAL. Maybe it's possible to activate table logging using SE13 to get the history, too. Than you could merge this data with the log entries.

Maybe you can try to use user exit SUSR0001 to log IP address (from function TH_USER_INFO and/or table USR41) in a custom table or via creating additional Security Audit Log entries for message AU1 (sucessful logon) for which you e.g. set the parameter &A or a new parameter &B with the IP address. See function RSAU_WRITE_TRAC_AUDIT_LOG to understand how to create such entries. (Limited to dialog logon only.)

There exist strong limitations of logging terminal ID and IP address in ABAP. A malicious user could spoof the terminal ID easily. The IP address can be problematic, too. For example if a reverse proxy (e.g. web dispatcher) for HTTP access is used, then all users will have the same IP address.

(German) Data Protection

Would the German Data protection authorities have an issue with activating this level of logging?

From a general point of view I would start with following assumptions:

1. Filter: Activate everything which is critical for all users '*' in all clients '*'.

➙ mostly ok, details should be confirmed

2. Filter: Activate everything for users 'SAP*' in all clients '*'

➙ ok

3. Filter: Activate everything for other support and emergency users, e.g. 'FF*' (FireFighter) in all clients '*'

➙ ok (assuming that you already have agreed on using GRC Super User Management)

4. Filter: Activate all events for the dialog activities 'logon' and 'transaction' for user 'DDIC' in all clients.

➙ ok

5. Filter: Activate everything for client '066'. This client is not used anymore and can be deleted.

➙ ok

6. Filter: Activate RFC events (AUL, AUK, AU6, AU5) for a short time for selected users to identity RFC connection problems easily

➙ you have to confirm this

7.-10. Filter: free for other project specific purpose

➙ you have to confirm this

Keep in mind that you have to discuss (among others) log creation, consolidation, archiving as well as retention periods and deletion.

Example from a German project (2010/2011) which was cleared through German, Austrian, French & Belgian data controllers:

Logging everything was OK as there is are legitimate reasons for it. The following additional controls were required:

Access to logs limited to Basis & Security team

Acceptable use (of logs) policy circulated to everyone with access

Data had to be summarized before use (e.g. could not be easily attributable to an individual. Obviously difficult to achieve if someone is in a team of 1...)

Distribution of data outside security team had to be approved by local data controller (local to the people who's data it was).

Detailed records existing outside the system had to be deleted after the summation work had been completed

Exceptions to these included:

legitimate use of data in event of security breach (agreed by local counsel and data controllers)

use of data with written approval of user (we used this a lot when redesigning access based on patterns of 'model' users).

I just found an additional recommendation about the protection of the files in a recent note:

In general, files of the Security Audit Log must not be accessed by other ABAP programs than the Security Audit Log application itself. Protect the files by assigning the appropriate S_DATASET authorizations to your users and by using S_PATH protection as described in note 177702. For this purpose, use an own dedicated folder for Security Audit Log files. Enter this directory into the SPTH table and enable the flags FS_NOWRITE and FS_NOREAD, thus disabling any read or write access from ABAP to this directory. Configure the Security Audit Log (parameter DIR_AUDIT) to use this directory.

GRC Fire Fighter logging

The application GRC Access Control Super User Management (aka FireFighter) consolidates logs from various sources:

Transaction Log: Captures transaction execution from transaction STAD

Change Log: Captures change log from change document objects (tables CDPOS and CDHDR)

System Log: Captures Debug & Replace information from transaction SM21

Security Audit Log: Captures Security Audit Log from transaction SM20

OS Command Log: Captures changes to OS commands from transaction SM49

Because of this we recommend to define a filter in the Security Audit Log which records all events for fire fighter users.

Performance

Q: Is there a significant performance impact (or any impact at all) if we enable the security audit log with the recommended settings? We've had resistance from some clients as they were worried that it will impact on the end user experience / slow down the system.

Unfortunately the FAQ note 539404 does not talk much about performance.

Well, the general rule is simple: There is no performance impact, not in time nor in space, if you log unsuccessful (=critical) events as these events happens rarely.

As soon as you start logging successful events you might look to space - the growing size of the audit files - but still not to time, as the Security Audit Log is optimized for speed.

Ertunga Arsal has written some noteworthy blogs about performance analysis of the Security Audit Log:

SAP Security Audit Logs: Which event types should I enable? There are 90 of them! And how much disk ...

SAP Security Audit Logs: Auditor wants me to switch ALL on!!! Here is what I told him

Conclusion: you do not need to care about time, and space is only important if you log specific successful events:

RFC function called (AUK respective EUE which take >70% of the space)

Successful RFC logon (AU5 which take >15%)

Successful Web Service Call (CUV which take >10% if the system uses web services extensively)

Report started (AUW which take >5%)

Successful JSON RPC call (DUR)

How to create customer-specific events

Using notes 1941526 and 1941568 you can utilize the custom messages DUX, DUY and DUZ in SAP_BASIS release as of 7.30. Call function RSAU_WRITE_CUSTOMER_EVTS to create these messages.

You can "reuse" other codes, i.e. CUY if you ensure that you still will be able to distinguish the messages. Nevertheless, you should interpret it as a (logical) modification of the SAP Standard.

in addition there exist other options to log custom specific events:

Application Log in ABAP

CCMS Alerts

Alerts send to the SAP Solution Manager

How to read the long texts of events

You can view the long text of Security Audit Log event messages using transaction SE92 (or in transaction SE61 if you choose the document class SL (Syslog).

Using note 1970644 you can get report RSAU_INFO_SYAG which shows all events of the Security Audit Log including the current status of activation. The detail view allows you to create an HTML-based event definition print list including the full documentation.

How to log critical debugger events

Using the debugger in general might already be seen as critical but using debug-change is considered as very critical by all auditors. The corresponding Security Audit Log messages for changing field content and for jumping within the code

Other Events, Critical, CUL Field content changed: &A

Other Events, Critical, CU_M Jump to ABAP Debugger: &A

are already covered by the 1st filter "Activate everything which is critical for all users in all clients" as proposed above.

These both messages are extended by another message to add more details describing the event:

Other Events, Critical, BUZ > in program &A, line &B, event &C

Limitation: debug-display is not logged!

The messages CUK, CUN, CUO, and CUP are related to the debugger as well.

How to track changes on the settings

Dynamic settings

The effective (dynamic) settings get logged in the Security Audit Log itself.

If you create - as recommended - a filter for "all clients, all users, all audit classes with severity 'critical'" than you already get the corresponding events of audit class "System":

System	Critical	AUE	Audit Configuration Changed
System	Critical	AUF	Audit: Slot &A: Class &B, Severity &C, User &D, Client &E, &F
System	Critical	AUG	Application Server Started
System	Critical	AUH	Application Server Stopped
System	Critical	AUI	Audit: Slot &A Inactive
System	Critical	AUJ	Audit: Active Status Set to &1

To identify events AUE, AUF, AUI triggered by starting an application server (compared with from events triggered by changing the dynamic profile), you can use one of the following methods:

You find event AUG shortly before

The fields for client, user, terminal and program are empty

The RFC function RSAU_GET_AUDIT_CONFIG provides the effective dynamic SAL configuration of an application server. This function is e.g. used by the data collector for the "Change Reporting / Configuration Validation" applications in SAP Solution Manager.

If available (as of SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP 17, 7.50 SP 7, 7.51 SP 2), the newer RFC function RSAU_API_GET_AUDIT_CONFIG should be used (see Note 2410004). The new function shows the active events in the known and complicated MSGVECT bit field as well as in text form in the MSG_LIST field.

In both cases, the dynamic settings of the called application server are obtained. One would have to query all active application servers to get a complete picture.

Static settings

The static settings are stored in table RSAUPROF. The system create table logs for any changes which you can view, i.e using report RSTBHIST.

The name of the active profile which is used while starting an application server is stored in field CURRPROF of the entry with PROFNAME = $CURPROF.

You can transport static profiles using a workbench transport which get transport entries for R3TR TABU RSAUPROF with table key PROFNAME=<profile name> SLOTNO=*. (You can transport the entry for $CURPROF as well, but I recommend to choose the active profile in the target system manually.)

As of SAP_BASIS 7.50 you have to add transport entries for R3TR TABU RSAUPROFEX with table key PROFNAME=<profile name> SLOTNO=*.

The Kernel parameters are stored in the special profiles $KERNEL$, etc.

We do not recommend to transport these parameters because of non-compatible changes between different SAP versions.

PROFNAME	SLOTNO	CLASSES	STATUS	Description
$KERNEL$	0001		" " / "X"	Security Audit active
$KERNEL$	0002		" " / "X"	Generic user selection
$KERNEL$	0003	number		Number of selection filters
$KERNEL$	0004		" " / "X"	One audit file per day
$KERNEL$	0005	number		Maximum Size of audit file (in case of single file per day)
$KERNEL$	0006		" " / "X"	Multiple audit files per day
$KERNEL$	0007	number		Maximum Size of an audit file (in case of multiple files per day)
$KERNEL$	0008	number		Maximum Size of all audit files (in case of multiple files per day)
$KERNEL$	0009		" " / "X"	Integrity protection format active
$KERNEL$	0010		" " / "X"	Log Target
$KERNEL$	0011		" " / "X"	Log Peer Address instead of Terminal
$CONFIG$	0099		" " / "A" / ...	Recording Status

As of SAP_BASIS 7.40 you can use transaction SM19 to add static filter definitions to a transport. See FAQ Note 539404 item [8].

The filters are stored in the entries having field SLOTNO > 0.

Field STATUS shows if a filter is active.

Field CLASSES shows the active audit classes. This is a bit-field summing up the values for the different audit classes (see include RSAUCONSTANTS😞

CONSTANTS: RSAU_CLASS_OTHER(4) TYPE x VALUE 1,
RSAU_CLASS_LOGIN(4) TYPE x VALUE 2,
RSAU_CLASS_TASTART(4) TYPE x VALUE 4,
RSAU_CLASS_REPORT(4) TYPE x VALUE 8,
RSAU_CLASS_RFCLOGIN(4) TYPE x VALUE 16,
RSAU_CLASS_USER(4) TYPE x VALUE 32,
rsau_class_system(4) type x value 64,
RSAU_CLASS_RFCCALL(4) TYPE x VALUE 128.

The audit class "System" is implicitly active and is not added, therefore you get the value CLASSES = 191 = 128 + 32+16+8+4+2+1 if you activate all audit classes.

Field SEVERITY shows the severity (see include RSAUCONSTANTS😞

CONSTANTS: RSAU_SEVE_LOW TYPE I VALUE 2,
RSAU_SEVE_MED TYPE I VALUE 5,
RSAU_SEVE_HIGH TYPE I VALUE 9.

If you have selected the detail settings, then field SELVAR contains the constant 01 (and field CLASSES = 0 and SEVERITY = 0). Field MSGVECT defines active events. (In this case you can deactivate "System" events.)

Active events are identified using individual bits at specific positions within field MSGVECT. The position is calculated using the alphanumerical order 0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ according to the SUBID of the events. The event area (AU, BU, CU, DU, EU) defines the bit which is added to the value on that position: AU = 80 (hex), BU = 40 (hex), CU = 20 (hex), DU = 10 (hex), EU = 08 (hex).

Only the first 36 positions of field MSGVECT are used. Every position holds two bytes therefore you see two hexadecimal characters per position.

Example showing active system events only (AUE AUF AUG AUH AUI AUJ😞

MSGVECT 000000000000000000000000000080808080808000000000000000000000000000000000...

SUBID 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Position -1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9--11--13--15--17--19--21--23--25--27--29--31--33--35--...

Change Reporting in the SAP Solution Manager

In addition to the local table logs of table RSAUPROF you can use the applications Change Reporting and Configuration Validation in the SAP Solution Manager to analyse changed settings. Use the configuration store AUDIT_CONFIGURATION. Be aware that the extractor gets a snapshot of the dynamic settings daily - that means it shows the effective settings according to profile parameters respective the overriding kernel parameters. Changes between two executions of the extractor are not cached. The configuration store does not show the user account who triggered the change. Therefore I recommend to use Change Reporting or Configuration Validation as a trigger for deeper analysis of the local table logs.

see: Configuration Validation Home

http://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/display/TechOps/ConfVal_Home

➙ Content of CCDB for a Technical System of type ABAP ➙ …

http://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/display/TechOps/ConfVal_ABAP_Content#ConfVal_ABAP_Content-AUDIT_CONFIGU...

What is the meaning of message BU4?

Question: I our productive environment am getting many times the message BU4 "Dynamic ABAP Coding: Event &A Event Type: &B Checksum: &C" but according to your post (and my old screen capture) the BU4 message should be for "Transport Request &A Contains Security-Critical Source Objects".

I searched but could not find anything about this issue...what do you recommend beside good luck :-)?

Answer: The definition of the message BU4 in transaction SE92 might be still wrong depending on the release of the system. According to note 539404 recording the events to transport security-relevant objects (BU3, BU4) is not yet implemented.

As described in note 1655743, the Kernel creates message BU4 "Dynamic ABAP Coding: Event &A Event Type: &B Checksum: &C" to flag usage of

'I' for INSERT REPORT

'G' for GENERATE SUBROUTINE POOL

'D' for DELETE REPORT

if setting in SM19 at 'Other entries' for 'Audit of generated dynamic ABAP' is active.

You will get events for message BU4 i.e. whenever transaction SE16 generated a report selection screen for a table which you view using this transaction.

(In addition entries in the db tables DYNABAPHDR and DYNABAPSRC are written if profile parameter abap/dyn_abap_log is set to the value "on".)

How can I read events using BAPIs?

The security alerts are also available to external programs using BAPIs (Business Application Programming Interfaces). The report RSAU_READ_AUDITLOG_EXTERNAL is a sample SAP program that you can use as a template for accessing the security alerts using BAPIs.

For the Security Audit Log (SAL) you will work with following result fields:

write: /
MSG_LINE_TBL-MSCGLLID(3), " SAL Message ID
MSG_LINE_TBL-MSCGLLID+4(14), " Time stamp (yyyymmddhhmmss)
MSG_LINE_TBL-MSCDATE, " Date
MSG_LINE_TBL-MSCTIME, " Time
MSG_LINE_TBL-MANDT, " Client
MSG_LINE_TBL-USERID, " User
XMI_RAW_TBL-MSGID(3), " SAL Message ID
XMI_RAW_TBL-MSGARG2, " SAL Message parameters seperated by '&'
XMI_EXT_TBL-MSG. " SAL Message text with parameters

Limitations:
- It seems that you have to address all application servers individually (however, I’m not sure as I’m not an expert for these BAPIs).
- Following fields seem not to be available: Terminal name, Transaction Code, Program, SAP process, Work Process Number

Documentation about using the BAPIs:

Including External System Management Programs in the CCMS Monitoring Architecture (2002)
https://archive.sap.com/documents/docs/DOC-16459

How to get a cross-reference about the creation of messages?

If you want to know which program triggers which message you can use the cross-reference feature of the development environment. Well, messages are no repository objects, therefore you cannot use it directly. However, many but not all messages are triggered by specific functions of methods per scenario. You can use the cross-reference for these triggers.

Have a look to method GET_TRIGGER_FOR_MSG of class CL_INFO_SYAG to view the list of triggers which are used to create audit messages. Then go for the cross-reference in transaction SE80 or SE84 for these functions and methods.

How to avoid logging for Auto-ABAP (SAPSYS) processing

If you do not want to log Security Audit Log events for Auto-ABAP processing (aka "SAPSYS processing") even if you log all events for user pattern SAP* you can assign a different username to this type of processing by setting following profile parameters:

rdisp/autoabapuser
rdisp/bgrfc_watchdog_user

To define the value for these profile parameters you enter the client, a comma and the user.

Example: 000,ZSAPSYS

This user has to exist in the choosen client with sufficient authorizations!

Create this user with user type B=system, no password and a role which contains at least following authorizations (you may start with full authorizations and use transaction STAUTHTRACE for a while to get the list of required authorizations):

Authorization object S_ADMI_FCD with field S_ADMI_FCD = PADM, ST0R

Authorization object S_BTCH_ADM with field BTCADMIN = Y

Authorization object S_DATASET with fields
ACTVT = 33
FILENAME = *
PROGRAM = RSCORE00, SSFALRTEXP

Authorization object S_RZL_ADM with field ACTVT = 01, 03

This tip was developed by a customer based on information within note 2288530. The customer has an even stronger requirement as mentioned above because they want to log everything in all clients for all users with just the exception to omit logging for Auto-ABAP processing. This customer use a special variation of the trick:

Auto-ABAP processing is executed by user SAPSYS______ (12 characters).

No other user name is longer than 11 characters.

The filter im transaction SM19 for the user name is defined as +++++++++++ (11 characters).

Comparison between old and new transactions as of 7.50

We recommend to use the new functions as soon as they are available for a larger part of the system landscape. Implement note 2743809 before using RSAU_CONFIG - this note contains important corrections.

Old transaction SM19 does not work correctly anymore as soon as you start using RSAU_CONFIG! To avoid using the old functions we recommend to lock the transactions (see note 2234192) and to write a comment into the profile parameter file.

Old function	New function as of 7.50	Description
Transaction SM18	Transaction RSAU_ADMIN	Log Data Administration
Transaction SM19	Transaction RSAU_CONFIG	Configuration
-	Transaction RSAU_CONFIG_SHOW = Report RSAU_CONFIG_SHOW	Show Configuration
Transaction SM20 = SM20N or Report RSAU_SELECT_EVENTS	Transaction RSAU_READ_LOG = Report RSAU_READ_LOG	Reporting
-	Transaction RSAU_READ_ARC = Report RSAU_READ_ARC	Reporting including archived data
-	Transaction RSAU_TRANSFER = Report RSAU_TRANSFER	Upload/Download Configuration Data
-	Report RSAU_INFO_SYAG	Show Message Definitions
Template report RSAU_READ_AUDITLOG_EXTERNAL	Function module RSAU_API_GET_LOG_DATA or static method GET_SAL_DATA of class CL_SAL_ALERT_API	Read Security Audit Log data in customer programs (see note 2641084)
Profile Parameters rsau/*	Kernel parameters in transaction RSAU_CONFIG	Settings

Is it possible to schedule Security Audit Log reports and send them via mail?

Transaction SM20 is a dialog transaction which does not offer scheduling options.

However you can use report RSAU_SELECT_EVENTS or new report RSAU_READ_LOG, which is available as of 7.50, instead. As these are standard reports you can schedule them as an background job, and you can send the results via mail like for any other background job.

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